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ABSTRACT
Accessing public Wi-Fi networks can be as dangerous as it is convenient. People who access a public WiFi network should engage in self-protective behaviors to keep their data safe from malicious actors on
the same network as well as persons looking over their shoulder, literally and proverbially. Using two
independent research designs, we examined under what circumstances were people more likely to
access an unsecured Wi-Fi network and engage in risky behavior on these networks. Findings from the
first study, based on survey data, reveal that people who are more situationally aware are less likely to
access personal accounts on public Wi-Fi, and more likely to cover their screen to prevent others from
viewing personal information. Additionally, findings show that people with higher computer
proficiencies are less likely to engage with public Wi-Fi. For the second study, our research team
designed and deployed honeypot Wi-Fi networks. We found that people are more likely to access these
unsecured, rogue networks in establishments with fewer on-duty employees and that do not offer
legitimate public Wi-Fi. Additionally, the number of on-duty employees is associated with an increase
in physical security behaviors, such as concealing a screen. We conclude by discussing how these
findings can aid in reducing susceptibility to online victimization.

Introduction
Public Wi-Fi networks provide a convenient, cost-effective way for accessing the Internet in areas
where a wired infrastructure is challenging. This convenience resulted in public Wi-Fi networks
appearing in public places in substantial numbers in recent years. In most cases, these wireless
networks do not require any form of user authentication or identification for using them (Zafft and
Agu 2012). This makes users vulnerable to privacy and security attacks. Additionally, wireless signals
leak beyond buildings in which access points are installed, so intruders can pick up these signals from
parking lots or nearby buildings (Zafft and Agu 2012).
A recent global survey found that among one hundred information technology security leaders, nearly
three-fourths report that they suffered a breach as a result of a mobile security issue, with thirty
percent of the breaches caused by unsecured wireless connections (Cockerill 2015). Another study
found that ninety-two percent of Americans have put personal information at risk, including their
bank account details, by transferring sensitive information over public Wi-Fi (Norton 2017).
Users are often encouraged to restrict their web traffic to information that is not considered sensitive
(e.g., avoid submitting financial information, usernames, and passwords). For instance, the Federal
Trade Commission (FTC) encourages public Wi-Fi users to take specific precautions while using these
networks. Users are instructed to use encrypted Wi-Fi networks, only enter personally identifiable
information on secured networks, use Virtual Private Network (VPN) connections, and avoid sending
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emails containing personal information (Rouge 2017). A few experts go further, suggesting that since
malicious Wi-Fi networks could be easily deployed by criminals (Zafft and Agu 2012), users should
completely avoid online banking and accessing sensitive data over a public Wi-Fi network, even if
these websites are encrypted (Conti et al. 2016). Many websites that request users to submit sensitive
data use Hypertext Transfer Protocol Secure (HTTPS) to ensure transferred data is encrypted.
However, HTTPS over a public Wi-Fi network can be compromised relatively easily and is not
recommended as a complete security solution (Krebs 2012).
Despite the continued efforts to improve public Wi-Fi users’ awareness of these hazards and the
security measures that they need to take (Holt and Bossler 2014; Norton 2017), a significant amount of
users continue to put their security at risk by submitting sensitive data both in public and over
unsecured Wi-Fi networks (Norton 2017). The security threat is particularly significant while using
public Wi-Fi networks because users must contend with potential offenders on the same network and
in the public space around them (Eiband et al. 2017), which are respective instances of “online” and
“offline” behaviors.
Regarding the latter, “shoulder surfing” is observing other people’s information without their consent
(Eiband et al. 2017). This has become a much greater threat due to the prevalence of mobile phones
equipped with cameras and video recorders (Eiband et al. 2017). Thieves can covertly snap pictures of
credit cards, credit applications, or record entire conversations while appearing to be texting or
talking on the phone (Brudy et al. 2014; Honan 2012). At its core, protective behavior involves
positioning the screen so that information is not viewable by others (Brudy et al. 2014). The literature
shows that self-protection is effective at preventing victimization (Bachman et al. 2002).
Situational Awareness (henceforth SA) includes being mindful of the surroundings and identifying
potential threats and dangerous situations. It may be important in determining network users’
adoption of self-protective behaviors, and consequently mitigating the threat of online crime over
public Wi-Fi networks. Specifically, it is possible that being aware of the physical surroundings plays
into a person’s decision-making and threat perception (Endsley 1995; Klein 1989) and leads to selfprotective behaviors.
This article examines SA in shaping public Wi-Fi users’ adoption of self-protective behaviors while
using public networks, including whether environmental cues (e.g., place managers or on-duty
employees) encourage users to be more aware of their security and be more protective. We draw on
the Situational Crime Prevention (SCP) perspective to understand how users protect themselves while
using public Wi-Fi networks. We consider whether SA and place management can be used to increase
our understanding regarding peoples’ decisions to employ self-protective behaviors while using public
Wi-Fi networks.
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The next section introduces the relevance of self-protective behaviors in reducing people’s likelihood
of becoming a crime victim. It also discusses the impact of SA and place management on both online
and offline self-protective behaviors. That is followed by a description of the two studies we
conducted. Finally, the results are presented and discussed.

Theoretical Background
Victim Self-Protective Behavior
Broadly speaking, criminologists differentiate between two major types of Victim Self-Protective
Behavior (VSPB): forceful and non-forceful resistance. Forceful resistance refers to active aggressive
behaviors like pushing, biting, and kicking, that are introduced by a victim directly against a
perpetrator in order to prevent an act of crime (Ullman 1997). Non-forceful resistance, on the other
hand, refers to passive resistance techniques that are used by a victim to avoid offenders, and
consequently, reduce the probability of a criminal event (Guerette and Santana 2010). Examples of
behaviors that could be classified as non-forceful strategies include avoiding an offender, escaping,
pleading, and begging. A majority of VSPB research has focused on types of self-protective behaviors
that are most effective in preventing rape completion (see Ullman 2007 for a review of the literature),
other studies demonstrate how resistance can decrease the likelihood of other forms of victimization
such as domestic violence (Bachman et al. 2002) and robbery (Guerette and Santana 2010; Ziegenhagen
and Brosnan 1985) from being completed.
More recently, scholars have examined self-protective behaviors employed by victims of various forms
of cyber abuse. Fissel (2018) operationalized self-protection as reporting victimization experiences to
the police, whereas Worsley et al. (2016) focused on the psychological impacts of victimization and
conceptualized self-protective behaviors as the implementation of various coping mechanisms. Lastly,
Sheridan and Grant (2007) identified the following self-protective behaviors that people engage in
when experiencing cyberstalking: changing employment/course of study, getting rid of car, increasing
security, changing identity, and giving up social activities. Although the literature is expanding to
include self-protective behaviors used in online environments, Nobles et al. (2014, p.993) accurately
state the literature “has not developed to the point where patterns in responses to victimization,
including self-protective behaviors taken by the victim, have been clearly identified.”
The dearth of literature is evident when examining VSPB for more technical forms of cyber
victimization. One environment in which Internet users are susceptible to victimization experiences is
when using public Wi-Fi networks. Although criminologist have done little to examine how users of
public Wi-Fi networks mitigate the risks of untrusted networks, several protective or coping behaviors
have been identified that reduces one’s risk of being victimized (Klasnja et al. 2009). These tend to be
solutions in which people can engage in the physical world (i.e., concealing their devices, ensuring that
others are not sitting immediately next to them, or being cognizant of potentially suspicious people
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around them (Klasnja et al. 2009)) or in cyber space (i.e., using remote VPN or avoiding accessing
personal information while on the network). Increasing such behavior and reducing risk-taking
behavior is of crucial importance for preventing the completion of criminal events (Bachman et al.
2002). Thus, getting users to reduce their risk online by protecting themselves and their data while
using public Wi-Fi networks is a key element of reducing vulnerability to cybercrime (Watts 2016). This
assumption is consistent with Clarke’s SCP framework (Clarke 1980).

Situational Crime Prevention
All in all, the SCP perspective is a preventive approach to crime that relies upon reducing opportunities
for crime by focusing on the relationship between the offender and the actual environment in which
the crime takes place. It is a general approach as well in reducing opportunities for any kind of crime
occurring in any kind of setting (Clarke 1995). The underlying premise of this perspective is that
criminals are rational beings who weigh the costs and benefits of their prospective behaviors.
Therefore, successful crime prevention efforts must involve the design and manipulation of human
environments to make offenders’ decisions to get involved in crime less attractive (Herath and Rao
2009). Drawing on the routine activities perspective assumption that opportunity is a root cause of
crime (Cohen and Felson 1979), Clarke (1980) proposes that crime can be prevented by reducing
criminogenic opportunities in the environment. The opportunity-reducing methods of SCP fit
systematic patterns and rules which cut across every walk of life, even though prevention methods
must be tailored to each situation. These methods aim to: increase the perceived effort of crime;
increase the perceived risks; reduce the anticipated rewards; prevent provocations; and remove
excuses for crime. For example, reducing rewards entails avoiding sending personal information and
avoiding accessing sensitive websites, such as banking websites, over public Wi-Fi networks (Reyns
2010). Increasing the effort for cyber criminals can be accomplished by avoiding accessing unknown
public Wi-Fi networks, restricting the submission of personal information over Wi-Fi networks, and by
the owners of the public Wi-Fi setting a password to access the network.
VSPBs in its various forms are of relevance in the context of this perspective since victims’ resistance
would increase offenders’ efforts to complete a criminal event and offset offenders’ cost and benefit
calculations (Guerette and Santana 2010). Moreover, victims’ use of non-forceful resistance techniques
like evasion and avoidance, in both online and offline situations, will remove the victim from the
criminogenic situation, and prevent the occurrence of a criminal event (Ziegenhagen and Brosnan
1985). However, we believe that the implementation of self-protective behaviors is dependent on
potential targets’ awareness of their environment (i.e., their level of SA).

Situational Awareness
SA is pertinent to people who find themselves in threatening situations (Rozee and Koss 2001). The
concept refers to adaptive, externally directed consciousness (Smith and Hancock 1995). SA generates
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behavior to achieve a goal in a specific task environment. Its products are knowledge about and
directed action within that environment (Smith and Hancock 1995). Most importantly, SA endows the
competence to generate appropriate behavior in response to complex and dynamic situations (Cohen
and Felson 1979; Klein 1989). This competence is based on long-term memory structures that allow
people to quickly understand a given situation: A person has prototypical situations in one’s memory,
with each corresponding to a “correct” action. Thus, in an unfolding situation, a person determines
how to act by matching its characteristics to a prototypical situation. SA, to be clear, is not a constant
across people. Some people demonstrate more of it. This may be a function of a person’s informationprocessing mechanisms as influenced by innate abilities, experience, and training; or, may reflect
preconceptions and objectives that filter and interpret the environment (Endsley 1995).

Place Management
The SCP perspective, as stated above, is comprised of measures “(1) directed at highly specific forms of
crime (2) that involve the management, design, or manipulation of the immediate environment in as
systematic and permanent a way as possible (3) so as to reduce the opportunities for crime and
increase its risks as perceived by a wide range of offenders" (Clarke 1983, p. 225). One of the original
strategies proposed by Clarke (1980) to reduce the occurrence of crime involves the introduction of
surveillance means. According to Clarke, the introduction of guardians and surveillance means in the
environment may mitigate crime by increasing offenders’ perceived threat of detection and
punishment. In general, Clarke and Homel (1997) identify three types of surveillance: natural
surveillance, formal surveillance, and surveillance by place managers (or surveillance by employees).
Natural surveillance involves the manipulation of the physical environment in order to improve a
person’s ability to observe the environment and increase the chance of offenders being detected when
committing a crime (Welsh et al. 2010). In the offline environment, this can be accomplished by
improving street lighting and promoting the “see something, say something” agenda. Formal
surveillance involves the introduction of official forms of crime prevention personnel, such as police
officers, security guards, and crime prevention hardware such as CCTV cameras, red light cameras,
and burglar alarms (Clarke 1997). Lastly, surveillance by place managers involves the use of employees
who have non-security related responsibilities in an organization to also fulfill a surveillance role
(Chen and Zahedi 2016). Such personnel include building attendants, concierges, park keepers, train
conductors, and convenience store clerks. A place managers primary responsibility is not to reduce
crime, but to ensure business operates smoothly through the management of social and physical
characteristics (Madensen 2007). However, these characteristics are also essential for crime
prevention, and effective place managers can reduce the opportunity for people to engage in crime.
If networks are places, then network administrators, designers, and facilitators are their place
managers (Reyns 2010). Managers of online places have a particularly important role in the prevention
of cybercrime especially when considering public Wi-Fi networks due to their nature (i.e., completely
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open physically and virtually). Network place managers potentially have great control over what
transpires within their networks and domains. In addition, they can limit access and set rules for
participation on the network. As such, their role in preventing online crimes is of paramount
importance (Reyns 2010).
Further, public Wi-Fi networks have criminogenic properties which make cybercrime possible by
providing easy opportunities for the crime to occur. Newman and Clarke (2003) describe elements of
information systems that are themselves conducive to crime using the acronym SCAREM. SCAREM
stands for Stealth (Internet users can effectively remain invisible while online), Challenge (e.g.,
hacker’s may enjoy the challenge presented by online crime); Anonymity (online environments are
inherently anonymous); Reconnaissance (the interconnected nature of the Internet makes it possible
for offenders to scan thousands of servers or computers for loopholes to exploit); Escape (the stealth
and anonymity aspects of online domains make it easier for offenders to avoid detection); and
Multiplicity (online domains provide multiple targets). It can be argued that public Wi-Fi networks
have the criminogenic qualities of SCAREM. For example, public Wi-Fi networks provide not only
fertile ground for cybercrime to take place (e.g., provides offenders with stealth, reconnaissance and
escape), but also a wealth of potential victims – all users of the network (multiplicity).
As discussed at the beginning of this section, surveillance can increase offenders perceived threat of
detection and punishment. Place managers can reduce the attractiveness of a location for criminals
(i.e., parking lot attendants can alert you of a recent spate of car thefts in the area and encourage you
to lock your car). Likewise, hotel concierges can alert you to dangerous areas in the vicinity. By using
place managers in the location of the public Wi-Fi network as sources of information and providers of
surveillance, users have a point of contact if they have queries about using the public Wi-Fi network
(i.e., employees of a public Wi-Fi location can be approached and questioned as to whether there is a
password for the public Wi-Fi network or whether a specific network that the user is picking up is
associated to the location or not). Thus, place managers help potential victims avoid the temptation of
accessing potentially malicious networks in the vicinity. Although the idea of place managers being
used to prevent the occurrence of crime has a rich theoretical development, it has not been subject to
rigorous evaluation research (Douglas and Welsh 2020). In fact, in a systematic review on alternative
measures of surveillance, Welsh and colleagues (2010) only identified two high-quality evaluations of
the effectiveness of place managers at reducing crime. However, neither of these examinations assess
the effectiveness of place managers at reducing the opportunity of online crime.

Hypotheses
Based on the above concepts, theories, and findings, we expect to find that when potential public Wi-Fi
users exhibit greater SA, they are more likely to: 1) Be aware that a public Wi-Fi network is available at
a place; and 2) Engage in more self-protective behaviors while using the public Wi-Fi network. In
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addition, we expect that public Wi-Fi users in places with more place managers will be enabled to
engage in more self-protective behaviors. Stated as hypotheses:
H 1. People with higher SA are more likely to use public Wi-Fi networks.
H 2. People with higher SA are more likely to use self-protective behaviors related to their use of public Wi-Fi
networks.
H 3. People in places with more place managers are more likely to use self-protective behaviors related to their
use of public Wi-Fi networks.

Analytic Design and Results
To test our research hypotheses, we collected data using two unique research designs. The first study
applied a survey methodology on university students’ computer and network usage to assess the first
two research hypotheses. To answer the third hypothesis, we implemented a field study that allowed
for the collection of public Wi-Fi network packet data across a chosen United States (US) state. All
statistical analyses in both studies were estimated using Stata/IC, version 15.1 (StataCorp LLC). We
now present the analytic strategies and results of the two studies.

Study 1
The first study consisted of a year-long survey conducted on the campus of a large US university and
was approved by the University of Maryland Institutional Review Board (350485-1). The survey was
designed to ask students about their computer and network usage, focusing on areas that could
potentially compromise the security and integrity of their systems as well as the security of the
network to which their systems are connected. Students in large introductory courses were recruited.
During recruitment, all potential participants were explained that participation in the study is
completely voluntary. Those who volunteered were given a hard copy of the survey and time, in class,
to fill it out. Our questionnaire was administrated during the academic years of 2014-2015 to 820
students. Once the data were cleaned, 749 responses were available for analysis.

Dependent Measures
Three dependent measures were constructed from the survey data: Uses Public Wi-Fi Network; Check
Online Personal Accounts on Public Wi-Fi Network; and Conceal Device Screen While Using Public Wi-Fi
Network. The first variable, Uses Public Wi-Fi Network, indicates whether the respondent uses a public
Wi-Fi network. If the respondent did connect to a public Wi-Fi network, they received a value of 1, and
if not, they received a value of 0. Next, Conceal Device Screen While Using Public Wi-Fi Network indicates
whether the respondent actively attempts to hide or position their computer screen out of sight of the
people around them while using a public Wi-Fi network. Those who reported actively concealing their
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screen received a value of 1, those who did not received a value of 0. The third variable, Check Online
Personal Accounts on Public Wi-Fi Network, indicates whether the respondent uses a public Wi-Fi
network to check personal accounts online (0=No, 1=Yes), such as bank accounts or email accounts.
This measure is our proxy for online self-protective behaviors.

Independent Measures
Independent measures captured respondents’ SA and sociodemographic characteristics. Situational
Awareness is a single item measure indicating the extent to which respondents were attentive of their
surroundings while using a public Wi-Fi network. Respondents were presented with the following
question. “Are you aware of the people around you when you are surfing the Internet while using a
public wireless Internet hotspot?” Response options ranged from 1 (Not aware) to 5 (Very aware). We
also constructed key control measures including Male (1=Male 0=Female), Age (In years), Annual Income
and Programming Experience. Annual Income was ordinally measured using the students’ self-reported
income with response options ranging between 1 (Below $20,000) to 12 ($220,000 and above). The
Programming Experience variable was ordinally measured as well and is used as a proxy measure to
assess a respondent’s proficiency with computers. Response options ranged between 0 (No
experience) to 3 (Fluent in at least one programing language).

Analytic Strategy
First, we present descriptive statistics for the variables of interest. Next, we estimate the relationships
between our list of dependent and independent variables using a series of Logit models, while
controlling for potentially relevant demographic characteristics. Logit models are used to estimate the
relationships between a list of independent variables and a dependent variable that is binary (0/1) in
form.

Results
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics on the variables constructed from the survey data. As shown in
the table, of the 749 respondents, 23% used public Wi-Fi networks, and 88% concealed their computer
screens while using public Wi-Fi networks. Additionally, 43% of the respondents who used public Wi-Fi
checked personal accounts online on the public Wi-Fi network. Over 65% of respondents claimed to be
aware of the presence of other people in the vicinity while using a public Wi-Fi network. Reflecting the
fact that the survey was conducted on at a large US university, respondents’ average age is 19.60.
Furthermore, nearly half of the respondents are male (49%), and 90% reported an income of less than
$20,000.
--Table 1 About Here--
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Table 2 presents findings estimated from the logit regression analyses. Model 1 of Table 2 reports the
logit regression results for all participants in the survey (n=749). In Model 1, we see the mean effect of
SA on the probability that the dependent variable takes a value of 1 (i.e., respondents use public Wi-Fi
networks) is positive and marginally significant (p<0.10). Male respondents appear to trust public WiFi networks less (p<0.05). Programming experience has a negative impact on the probability of using
public Wi-Fi networks (p<0.05). That is, respondents who are more proficient with computer
programming languages reported using public Wi-Fi networks significantly less. Model 2 of Table 2
shows that respondents who are situationally aware do not check personal accounts when using public
Wi-Fi. Again, this result is marginally significant (p<0.10). However, respondents with programming
experience are much less likely to check online personal accounts while using public Wi-Fi (p<0.01).
Model 3 of Table 2 shows that respondents who are situationally aware are more likely to conceal their
screens while using a public Wi-Fi network (p<0.01).
--Table 2 About Here-Table 3 presents re-estimated results that were generated from Table 2’s Models 3 and 4 to assess the
robustness of these earlier findings. This was accomplished by restricting the analyzed sample to the
respondents who admitted to using public Wi-Fi networks (n=164). Model 1 of Table 3 suggest that
respondents who both use public Wi-Fi networks and practice situational awareness are less likely to
check personal accounts online (p<0.10). This finding is marginally significant. Similarly, Model 2 of
Table 3 shows that respondents who are situationally aware are more likely to conceal their screens
when using public Wi-Fi (p<0.10). This finding is also marginally significant.
--Table 3 About Here--

Study 2
The second study consisted of a separate data collection effort. The following procedure was approved
by the University of Maryland Institutional Review Board (402261-1). Specifically, we set up our own
private Wi-Fi network at 109 coffee houses, restaurants, and hotels around the state of Maryland. We
chose businesses that were relatively homogenous in size and customer profile (i.e., users of smart
phones and/or laptops in order to reduce the possibility of an omitted confounding effect) while using
a list of businesses obtained from the Maryland Department of Commerce. All selected business were
located less than 60 miles away from University of Maryland campus. We collected data at each
business at three periods in a day (Morning, Afternoon, and Evening), for one hour during each period.
Due to hours of operation, we were not always able to visit each location three times in a single day.
Five students (one per location) were tasked as research observers and were assigned with the task of
attending each business and setting up our network. These students went through an hour-long

10

CrimRxiv

Situational Awareness and Public Wi-Fi Users’ Self-Protective Behaviors

training session in which they were explained how the network should be set up and how they should
check its functionality.
When a person would look for available Wi-Fi networks, ours appeared as an available, but private,
connection. It was labeled as “private” and, thus, potential users knowingly trespassed on an unknown
private network. There were no authentication requirements to join. Some, but not all, businesses
offered an accessible public Wi-Fi network to guests. At the establishments which made it available,
people could see the business’ Wi-Fi network and our unknown private Wi-Fi network. When
searching for a connection, users are able to view all Wi-Fi networks within range of connection,
meaning other networks not belonging to the business or our research team were also viewable in
some instances.
We collected data over a 16-month period between August 2015 and December 2016. Upon arrival at a
given business, we set up our private Wi-Fi network and collected data on the physical space. Data
collection included a simple count of the number of customers and employees in the location
throughout the one-hour long session. Figure 1 is an example diagram of the physical location and the
type of physical space data collected during each period. The diagrams contain information on the
space’s physical traits, including the shape of the room, the number of entrances and exits, the size
and positioning of tables and seats, and any employee-only areas of the location. Figure 1 also contains
information on all people in the space, including the number of them; and, for each person, their
perceived gender, whether an employee or guest, possession of devices-in-use, movement through and
use of the space, arrival and departure times.
--Figure 1 About Here--

Sample
We visited 109 businesses but excluded 29 of them from analyses. The excluded businesses were in
city centers, train stations, and museums that, due to their busyness, proved too difficult to reliably
collect data on. With those excluded from the sample, we were left with 208 one-hour sessions
(duration one hour) at 80 businesses. The average location had 20 people total during the one-hour
session (Min=1, Max=58). On average, 17 of these people were customers (Min=1, Max=58), and 2.73
were employees (Min=1, Max=12). The mean number of laptops is 2.30 (Min=0, Max=42.33) and the
mean number of visible mobile devices is 3.30 (Min=0, Max=22).

Dependent Measures
When examining the data, we were interested in offline and online VSPB. To measure online VSPB, we
constructed a dummy variable entitled Accessed Unknown Wi-Fi Network, taking the value of 1 if
someone accessed our network, and 0 if they did not. If the private and unknown network was
accessed, risky behavior was demonstrated by the user. Our measure of offline VSPB is % Devices

11

CrimRxiv

Situational Awareness and Public Wi-Fi Users’ Self-Protective Behaviors

Concealed. It captures the percentage of people (within the one-hour session) who concealed their
devices by positioning their backs immediately to the wall or sitting more than one chair away from
other potential network users (employees excluded).

Independent Measures
Six independent variables were measured in our second study: % Employees; % Male; Morning;
Afternoon; Evening; and Other Network. The first independent measure % Employees shows the
percentage of total occupants in any given business location that were employees of that location. The
% Employees variable includes the total number of employees present at any time during our one-hour
session. Similarly, we constructed % Male, which is the percentage of total male occupants in any given
business location during our one-hour session. We also constructed three dummy variables to capture
the time of day. The variable Morning took the value of 1 if the session took place in the morning time
(8:00 a.m. – 11:00 a.m.) and 0 otherwise. Likewise, the variable Afternoon (12:00 p.m. – 2:00 p.m.) took
the value of 1 if the session took place in the afternoon and 0 otherwise. Lastly, the variable Evening
(5:00 p.m. – 8:00 p.m.), which is used as the reference category, took the value of 1 if the session took
place in the afternoon and 0 otherwise. To capture availability of other public Wi-Fi networks available
at the business, we constructed a dummy variable entitled Other Network. This measure took the value
1 if another Wi-Fi network was available in the business and the value 0 if no other Wi-Fi networks
were available.

Analytic Strategy
We use Hierarchical Linear (HLM) and Hierarchical Generalized Linear (HGLM) Models (Raudenbush
and Bryk 2002) to capture the effect of independent measures on VSPB with respect to public Wi-Fi
networks. Overall, multilevel modeling allows for the analysis of individual behaviors within larger
units of aggregation (i.e., neighborhoods, schools, organizations, etc.) and addresses two potential
biases that may occur when applying ordinary regression techniques to clustered data. First, it allows
for more accurate estimates of standard errors when cases are clustered (and potentially correlated)
within larger units. Second, it provides estimates of the impact of cross-level interactions between the
larger unit of aggregation characteristics and individual-level factors. Since our private Wi-Fi network
observations are embedded within place, we use two-level linear models to predict the volume of
concealed computer screens, and two-level logit models to estimate public Wi-Fi users’ probability to
access the private and unknown Wi-Fi network (Raudenbush and Bryk 2002). For each type of
analysis, we specify the observation data (Level 1), while allowing for the intercept to vary across
places (Level 2).

Results
Table 4 presents descriptive statistics for the variables constructed using online and offline
observations. In 16% of the one-hour sessions, our private Wi-Fi network was accessed by persons at
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the business. The average percentage of people who concealed their screen in these businesses was
9.19%. The average percentage of employees (versus customers) across businesses was 20.76%. Males
and females visited the businesses at nearly even rates, with males making up nearly half (48.88%) of
the population. Most of the businesses (80%) provided a Wi-Fi network (Other Network) for guests to
access.
--Table 4 About Here-Table 5 presents results from the multilevel linear and logit regression analyses. For Model 1, the
estimates show that the effect of % Employees on the probability that the dependent variable takes a
value of 1 (respondents access an unknown private Wi-Fi network) is negative (-6%) and significant
(p<0.05). Thus, the higher the percentage of employees (versus guests) in a location, the higher the
level of online VSPB. Model 2’s estimates, which adds control variables, imply a similar effect of the %
Employees on respondents accessing a private and unknown Wi-Fi networks (-7%) and is significant
(p<0.01). In addition, these estimates show that the effect of Other Network on the probability of
accessing unknown networks is negative (-26%) and significant (p<0.05). Therefore, the higher the
percentage of employees (versus guests) in a location and the ability to access other publicly available
networks (versus no other publicly available networks), the higher the level of online VSPB.
--Table 5 About Here-For Models 3 and 4 of Table 5, the mean effect of the % Employees measure on the percentage of users
concealing the device screens (% Devices Concealed) is positive and significant (p<0.05). These model
estimates suggest that a higher proportion of employees to guests makes the latter more likely to
conceal their devices. Additionally, Model 4 shows that being male increases the likelihood of a person
concealing their device (p<0.05). From these results, we see overall that more employees relative to
guests leads to more offline and online VSPB.

Discussion
The Internet facilitates ways for criminals to easily access valuable information. With occurrences of
cyber-criminality on the rise year after year (Norton 2017) and hackers attacking computers and
networks at a near-constant rate (Cukier 2007), in conjunction with law enforcements’ inability to
combat these occurrences (Burruss et al. 2019), it is increasingly important to find ways to mitigate
cyber-crime. Public Wi-Fi networks are often unsecured, which make their users vulnerable to
attacks. Worse yet, most users of these public Wi-Fi networks believe their information is safe while
using them (Norton 2017). This unawareness increases the chance of users becoming online victims
(Balebako et al. 2011).
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In this article, we contribute to the (cyber-)criminological literature by providing insight into whether
users of public Wi-Fi networks are aware of the risks and use online and offline VSPB. We share
findings from two studies, the first being survey-based and the second a field study, used to test three
hypotheses. As detailed above and discussed below, findings support all three hypotheses. In line with
the first hypothesis, we find that people who are more situationally aware are more likely to use public
Wi-Fi networks. In support of our second hypothesis, we find that users of public Wi-Fi who exhibit SA
are significantly more likely to conceal their devices and significantly less likely to visit email and
banking websites when using a public Wi-Fi network. In other words, situationally aware people are
more likely to engage in VSPB.
These findings indicate that SA is vital to VSPB. It follows that a practical implication of the results is
that raising SA should reduce online victimization. SA training could be incorporated into computer
training efforts, for example. Additionally, SA could be raised in the immediate by posting
notifications in the vicinity of public Wi-Fi networks. To ensure people understand the risk, such
training and notices should specify that public Wi-Fi networks put their data at risk.
The second study tested our third research hypothesis. Using a field study, we examined whether the
higher the percentage of employees (place managers) in a public Wi-Fi network location increased the
VSPB of Wi-Fi users. We find that more employees relative to guests is associated with less use of our
private Wi-Fi network and more device concealment.
These findings demonstrate the importance of employee or place manager presence because it
increases the likelihood of people not only protecting themselves offline by concealing their screens
but also protecting themselves online by avoiding unknown networks. It could be that this relationship
is explained because more employees makes it easier to obtain the business’ Wi-Fi network password
or confirm the Wi-Fi network’s legitimacy. Moreover, this social milieu could lead public Wi-Fi users to
be more sensitive to or otherwise aware of risk, making them less likely to access our network. A
further explanation is that because our Wi-Fi network was marked private, people in its vicinity were
more fearful of trespassing when there was a proportionately larger number of employees surveilling
the location. In regard to offline behavior, the presence of employees may make the location more
crowded, which could incentivize users to better protect themselves physically from observation
attacks by protecting their screens; alternatively, employees may advise the users of such actions.
From testing these hypotheses, we uncovered other interesting patterns. People who were more
proficient with computers (programming experience) reported using public Wi-Fi significantly less
(50%). Perhaps those with computer skills are more familiar with the associated risk, and thus avoid
public Wi-Fi networks in favor of other options such as personal Wi-Fi hotspots. This finding indicates
that the more users become proficient with computers, the more aware they are of the risks involved
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in using them. This can help organizations when trying to identify, and thus prioritize, which
employees are in most need of security training.
Finally, in our second study, we see that when a business offers a Wi-Fi network in their location for
their customers, the likelihood of those users utilizing an unknown Wi-Fi network in that location is
significantly reduced. Therefore, it may be worthwhile for governments or businesses to consider
installing their own secure public Wi-Fi networks in locations where users would expect Wi-Fi
networks. This can be done to reduce the occurrence of Wi-Fi users availing of unknown Wi-Fi
networks in public places and putting themselves at risk.

Implications for Research
These findings substantiate and extend three sets of criminological inquiry: the relevance of the SCP
perspective in understanding how to reduce attacks on users of public Wi-Fi (Chen and Zahedi 2016;
Clarke 1997; Reyns 2010; Welsh et al. 2010); the types of users that employ VSPB while using public WiFi (Bachman et al. 2002; Klasnja et al. 2009; Watts 2016); and, the environmental cues that encourage
VSPB (Bachman et al. 2002; Klasnja et al. 2009; Watts 2016). Additionally, we answer Douglas and
Welsh’s (2020) call for additional research into the effectiveness of place managers at reducing
opportunities for crime. Moreover, the findings contribute to the information security literature that
has investigated cyber security from various perspectives (Anderson and Agarwal 2010; Wright et al.
2014; Wright and Marett 2010; Xiao and Benbasat 2011). In particular, we show the need to understand
how Internet users protect themselves from physical and virtual security threats in the context of
public Wi-Fi use (Bachman et al. 2002; Brudy et al. 2014; Klasnja et al. 2009). We extended this vein of
research by extending the focus to offline VSPB in mitigating observation attacks, such as shoulder
surfing.

Implications for Practice
This work also carries practical implications for providers of public Wi-Fi networks. These
organizations should promote guests’ awareness of whether the business offers Wi-Fi access and, if so,
how to access it (e.g., its name and password). Our findings suggest this will naturally result from
having more employees on site, though it could be promoted through signage. Furthermore, practical
implications for organizations stem from the finding that more proficient computer users engage in
more online and offline VSPB. Training and education in technology can help people become more
aware of their security. This should be sure to include – and expanded as needed – information on the
types and techniques of online and offline VSPB useful for preventing attacks related to the use of
public Wi-Fi networks.
Governments across the world are turning to the idea of nudging people into making safer decisions in
many aspects of life. In fact, some governments are creating ‘nudge units’, due to growing recognition
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that almost every policy issue has a human-behavioral aspect at its core. For example, the Social and
Behavioral Sciences Team (SBST) of the US government was founded to use insights from psychology,
behavioral economics, and other decision sciences to improve federal programs and operations.
Similar teams are found in Canada, Germany, Israel, New South Wales, Singapore, and the UK
(Halpern 2015; Marron 2015). Our findings suggest that the idea of nudging people into making safer
decisions is applicable in not only physical spaces, but also cyberspace.

Limitations
Although the findings presented above have theoretical and policy implications, both studies have
notable limitations. Our first study, which employed a sample of college students in Maryland, suffers
from issues related to omitted variable bias, external validity, response bias, and the inability to
establish causal relationships. It is likely that other variables, which are not included in the model,
influence behavioral patterns while using public Wi-Fi networks. In this case, the coefficients and
standard errors presented are bias. Additionally, we employ a relatively small sample of college
students attending the same university in the state of Maryland. It is likely, and even probable, that
findings drawn using such a sample are not generalizable to the national population. It is also possible
that our respondents did not answer the survey questions truthfully. They may have purposefully
provided falsified information or simply provided misinformation by mistake. Lastly, the crosssectional nature of our study prevents estimating causal relationships.
Our second study, which utilizes field data, also suffers from notable limitations. Similar to the first
study, we utilize cross-sectional data, which limits are ability to make causal statements. Additionally,
the findings presented reflect the behavior of public Wi-Fi users within a 60 mile radius of the
University of Maryland campus. It is unclear if these findings are generalizable to public Wi-Fi users
in other locations. One may also argue the study suffers from issues concerning ethics. The research
team did not request permission from the managers of the businesses in which the Wi-Fi networks
were deployed, nor did we request consent from the people visiting the establishment during our
observations. However, neither our research team nor the institutional review board viewed this as an
ethical issue since personally identifiable data was not collected. Moreover, the estimated models
likely suffer from omitted variable bias. Relatedly, our measures of SA are restricted to people being
aware of their surroundings (i.e., being aware of the presence of place managers in a location).
Building upon the current study, research should examine whether the presence of physical items
within an environment, other than people, increases VSPBs. Such items include physical
notifications/signs, both in the online and offline environment. As alluded to above, signage may
remind or alert people to increase their security measures (i.e., be aware of who is sitting or standing
nearby, do not send sensitive information over public Wi-Fi networks, or there is no public Wi-Fi
network associated with the location in question). Offline and online signs act as deterrents to persons
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who may engage in risky behavior (Howell et al. 2017; Jacques 2019; Maimon et al. 2014). Future
research could investigate whether a similar effect occur in in the context of Wi-Fi networks.
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Tables
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics (Study 1).

Variables

Mean

SD

Min

Max

0.23

0.42

0

1

0.43

0.49

0

1

0.88

0.31

0

1

Dependent variables:

Uses Public Wi-Fi
Network

Check Online
Personal Accounts on
Public Wi-Fi
Network

Conceal Device
Screen While Using
Public Wi-Fi
Network

Independent variables:
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Situational

3.28

1.12

1

5

Male

0.49

0.50

0

1

Age

19.60

1.90

17

39

Annual Income

1.31

1.43

1

12

Programing

0.36

0.65

0

3

Awareness

Experience

Note. n = 749

Table 2. Public Wi-Fi Use and Adoption of Online and Offline Self-Protective Behaviors Regressed Over Individual’s
Situational Awareness (Study 1).

Variables

Uses Public Wi-Fi Network
Model 1

Check Online Personal Accounts

Conceals Device Screen While

on Public Wi-Fi Network

Using Public Wi-Fi Network

Model 2

Model 3

b (SE)

OR

b (SE)

OR

b (SE)

OR

†0.13 (0.02)

1.14

†-0.12 (0.07)

0.88

**0.52 (0.11)

1.68

Male

*-0.44 (0.19)

0.64

0.21 (0.17)

1.23

0.01 (0.24)

1.01

Age

0.04 (0.04)

1.04

-0.05 (0.05)

0.95

-0.05 (0.05)

0.95

Annual

0.08 (0.05)

1.08

0.01 (0.05)

1.01

-0.04 (0.07)

0.95

*-0.98 (0.52)

0.83

**-0.41 (0.15)

0.66

-0.11 (0.27)

0.89

Situational
Awareness

Income

Programing
Experience

Constant

2.77 (2.70)

1.02 (0.97)

1.51 (1.10)

Pseudo R2

0.03

0.02

0.05
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Ln likelihood

-378.17

-406.42

-253.99

AIC

772.35

828.85

519.99

Note. n = 749. b = regression coefficient; SE = standard error; OR = odds ratio; AIC = akaike information criterion. †p ≤
0.10, *p ≤ 0.05, **p ≤ 0.01.

Table 3. Adoption of Online and Offline Self-Protective Behaviors Regressed Over Individual’s Situational Awareness
Among Public Wi-Fi Users Only (Study 1).

Variables

Check Online Personal Accounts on Public

Conceals Device Screen While Using Public

Wi-Fi Network

Wi-Fi Network

Model 1

Model 2

b (SE)

OR

b (SE)

OR

†-0.25 (0.15)

0.78

†0.52 (0.27)

1.69

Male

0.36 (0.37)

1.43

-0.82 (0.15)

0.44

Age

-0.17 (0.12)

0.84

-0.12 (0.12)

0.88

Annual Income

-0.41 (0.22)

0.65

-0.14 (0.12)

0.87

Programing

-0.46 (0.33)

0.63

0.21 (0.49)

1.23

Situational
Awareness

Experience

Constant

†
4.35 (2.09)

3.74 (2.66)

Pseudo R2

0.07

0.09

Ln likelihood

-107.14

-46.01

AIC

226.28

104.02

Note. n = 164. b = regression coefficient; SE = standard error; OR = odds ratio; AIC = akaike information criterion. †p ≤
0.10, *p ≤ 0.05, **p ≤ 0.01.
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Table 4. Descriptive Statistics (Study 2).

Variables

Mean

SD

Min

Max

0.16

0.37

0

1

9.19

20.84

0

100

% Employees

20.76

14.62

0

100

% Male

48.88

15.18

0

100

Morning

0.33

0.47

0

1

Afternoon

0.38

0.48

0

1

Evening

0.29

0.45

0

1

Other Network

0.80

0.40

0

1

Dependent Variables:

Accessed Unknown
Wi-Fi Network

% Devices Concealed

Independent Variables:

Note. n = 208 (across
80 locations)

Table 5. Logit and Linear Multilevel Random Intercept Models of Honeypot Sessions (Study 2).

Variables

% Employees

Accessed Unknown Wi-Fi Network

% Devices Concealed

Model 1

Model 3

Model 4

Model 2

b (SE)

OR

b (SE)

OR

b (SE)

b (SE)

*-0.06 (0.02)

0.94

**-0.07 (0.03)

0.92

*0.28 (0.14)

*0.32 (0.14)
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% Male

0.01 (0.02)

1.01

*0.20 (0.11)

Morning a

0.52 (0.56)

1.67

5.74 (3.11)

Afternoon a

0.30 (0.55)

1.34

2.10 (2.89)

Other

*-1.26 (0.64)

0.28

4.32 (5.19)

Network

Constant

*-0.98 (0.52)

-0.65 (1.19)

4.52 (0.35)

-12.41 (0.82)

Rho

0.33

0.29

0.53

0.49

Df

3

7

4

8

Ln likelihood

-85.96

-83.26

-754.46

-750.22

AIC

177.93

180.53

1516.94

1516.44

Note. n = 208 (across 80 locations). b = regression coefficient; SE = standard error; OR = odds ratio; Rho = Spearman’s
Rho; Df = degrees of freedom; AIC = akaike information criterion. †p ≤ 0.10, *p ≤ 0.05, **p ≤ 0.01. a Reference
category = Evening

Figure
Figure 1. Observations Recorded During a One Hour Honeypot Session (Study 2).
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